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ELECTING JUSTICE 
Sol Wachtler* 
IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICE. By Joseph R. Grodin. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press. 1989. Pp. xxi, 208. $20. 
This small volume makes one of the best arguments I have yet seen 
against the encroachment of electoral politics into the process of se-
lecting judges. The argument is made by one with first-hand knowl-
edge; Joseph Grodin's1 four-year tenure on the California Supreme 
Court ended as a result of a 1986 retention election in which, as he 
puts it, "a majority of California voters decided that I, along with my 
colleagues Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justice Cruz Rey-
noso, should do something else" (p. xvii). His book, Jn Pursuit of Jus-
tice: Reflections of a State Supreme Court Justice, describes that 
experience and the years on the bench that preceded it. 
To the author's credit, however, the overriding tone is not bitter-
ness for having been removed but gratitude for having been permitted 
to serve. Only one chapter, the last, is devoted specifically to the sub-
ject of judicial elections and, although in that context the author is 
openly critical of the process, that is hardly the explicit theme of the 
book. 
The scope of the work is much broader, ambitiously so. Justice 
Grodin includes several topics - for example, a history and analysis 
of the common law and a discussion of the emergence of state consti-
tutional law - that could themselves fill volumes. One may wonder 
whether it is possible to do justice (so to speak) to any one of these 
topics in only 188 pages, but Grodin does surprisingly well. He recog-
nizes that there are already works that treat these su~jects in depth 
and detail and he does not try to replicate or outdo them. Instead, he 
draws upon their scholarship to provide a pithy synthesis accessible to 
a broad audience. It is a legal education for the layperson. 
No, Grodin does not explain the Rule in Shelley's Case or the dis-
tinction between res judicata and issue preclusion. What he offers is 
far more important for a public with a role in the selection of judges: 
an understanding of how appellate judges in the state systems go about 
their business and the kind of constraints under which they operate. 
* Chief Judge, New York Court of Appeals. -Ed. 
1. Justice Grodin is currently a law professor at the University of California at Hastings. 
B.A. 1951, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1954, Yale; Ph.D. 1960, University of 
London. 
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Part I describes the structure of the appellate court system and the 
mechanics of appellate judging. It is, in part, autobiographical. Jus-
tice Grodin uses the story of his own ascent through the California 
courts, which he attributes in part to a longstanding friendship with 
Justice Matthew Tobriner, to describe the levels and standards of ap-
pellate review. He provides a rare inside look at the workings of an 
appellate court - the assignment of opinions, the use of law clerks, 
the conduct of conferences, and how judges view oral argument, 
among other things. He endorses the tradition of generalist courts and 
diversity among judges, both of which foster the development of the 
law through a kind of cross-pollination, as concepts developed in one 
area are applied by analogy in other areas (pp. 22-25). 
In Part II, entitled "Function/' Justice Grodin describes some of 
the variety of issues that state appellate courts face -with separate 
chapters devoted to common law, criminal, and constitutional cases. 
In the criminal area, he laments the tremendous drain on judicial re-
sources attending death penalty cases, arguing that the disproportion-
ate amount of time that must be spent on such cases is reason enough 
to abolish capital punishment (pp. 100-01). 
The chapter on constitutional adjudication focuses on the recent 
emergence of state constitutions as an independent source of individ-
ual rights. As a New Yorker, I read with interest that New York's 
state constitution was an influential model for the drafters of Califor-
nia's first constitution; half of California's Declaration of Rights was 
adopted from guarantees of individual liberties contained in the New 
York constitution. 
The book's final section is something of an overview. The first of 
the two chapters in this section concerns one of the eternal questions 
in legal scholarship: Do judges make law? Most modem scholars -
former Attorney General Meese notwithstanding - agree that the ju-
diciary has a legitimate lawmaking function. Justice Grodin aptly 
notes, however, that the judicial role varies with the source of the law 
that frames the legal issues in a given case. The court's role in a case 
involving statutory interpretation, for example, is not the same as its 
role in a common law case and it is different still in a constitutional 
case (p. 134). Legal philosophers do not always acknowledge these 
differences in their discussions of judicial lawmaking. 
The book ends, appropriately enough, with Justice Grodin's reflec-
tions on his experience as the subject of a retention election. He brings 
home the dilemma of a judge who is criticized for his voting record 
but who is constrained in his efforts to defend that record by ethical 
restrictions against talking publicly about the court's decisions. There 
is also the unseemliness of seeking campaign contributions, when the 
contributors - or those who fail to contribute - may appear before 
the court in the future. Even if the judge is able to detach himself 
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from those considerations when deciding cases, the public perception 
of the judiciary cannot be enhanced by such a process. Even worse is 
the danger that the impending election may influence the judge's vote 
on a case decided during the campaign. Most judges would make 
every effort to avoid deciding a case based on how it would effect the 
campaign but, as Justice Grodin notes, one would have to be superhu-
man not to at least think about it from time to time. One of his col-
leagues compared it to brushing your teeth in the bathroom and trying 
not to notice the crocodile in the bathtub {p. 177). 
I began with the observation that Justice Grodin's book makes a 
powerful argument against judicial elections. From this survey of the 
book's contents, this may appear to be an overstatement of the impor-
tance of that topic - much more of the book is, in fact, devoted to 
other themes. But all of this other information is a foundation for an 
important (and true) premise of the argument. It demonstrates that 
the bare results of a court's decision - the reversal of a conviction, the 
reinstatement of a jury verdict, and the like - say less about the deci-
sionmakers than the public may think. Most cases present a narrow 
range of options for the appellate judge. As Justice Grodin explains, 
appellate courts have, at best, limited power to review the facts, and 
the legal issues are framed by existing statutes and precedents. The 
particular case before the court cannot be viewed in isolation; it must 
be examined with an eye toward similar cases that have been decided 
in the past and those that may arise in the future. 
Judges, of course, must take these things into account. The public, 
on the other hand, is free to judge a case based on its own impression 
of the facts and according to what it thinks the law ought to be. This 
approach gives the public a substantial advantage in justifying a popu-
lar result, but it is inconsistent with our commitment to the rule of 
law. 
This book thus illustrates the kind of insights that are minimally 
necessary to make an informed evaluation of judicial decisions, and 
demonstrates why the public is not well served by a judicial selection 
process that is little more than a referendum on the results of individ-
ual cases. It is surprising that Justice Grodin is able to convey so 
many of these concepts so well in a relatively short written work. It 
would be astonishing if anyone could do the same in the context of a 
political campaign. These are concepts that demand elaboration and 
reflection, not slogans and sound bites. 
There are, of course, other reasons why the judiciary should not be 
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of popular opinion, especially where in-
dividual liberties are at stake. An institution charged with safeguard-
ing individuals from the potential tyranny of the majority cannot do 
its job as well if it must answer to the majority. I wish it were possible 
to eliminate partisan politics from the process of selecting judges, but 
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political realities do not bode well for this prospect, at least not in the 
near future. In the meantime, however, it may be possible to temper 
the effects. Justice Grodin suggests that, at the very least, we should 
make an effort to raise the level of discourse in judicial campaigns -
to shift the focus away from a judge's "voting record." In his words, 
It is vital to insulate incumbent judges from gross political pressures in 
the performance of their duties. In order to do that we need to establish 
a consensus of constraint .... [W]e should vote to oust an incumbent 
judge in favor of a challenger not simply because we like the challenger 
better, nor because we are unhappy with some of the incumbent's deci-
sions, nor because the governor who appointed the judge offends us, but 
only when it is demonstrated to our satisfaction that the incumbent is 
deficient as a judge in some important respect. That we may regard a 
judge as being too "liberal" or "conservative" is not sufficient unless we 
are convinced that the judge's view of the law and its relationship to 
society is so extreme that it lies outside the mainstream of legal thought 
and community values. And we must be very careful in making that 
judgment, so as to avoid creating an atmosphere in which politics be-
comes the dominant criterion. If we are unsure, I think we owe the in-
cumbent the benefit of the doubt. [pp. 185-86] 
Of course, developing such a consensus will require an educational 
effort. The public is not likely to change its habits without knowing 
why the criteria applied to other offices are inappropriate for judicial 
elections. This book, which illuminates the role of the judiciary for a 
lay audience, is a fine beginning. 
Justice Grodin's reflections on his years on the bench reveal him to 
be thoughtful, intelligent, dedicated, and compassionate. In the end, 
perhaps the book's most compelling argument against judicial elec-
tions is the unstated one: a selection process that deprives the system 
of judges like Justice Grodin must be flawed. 
